The Greek Concept of Justice by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 77 Issue 3 
1979 
The Greek Concept of Justice 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Legal History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, The Greek Concept of Justice, 77 MICH. L. REV. 864 (1979). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol77/iss3/37 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE GREEK CONCEPT OF JUSTICE.* By Eric A. Havelock. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press. 1978. Pp. ix, 382. $16.50. 
In his classic study, The Discovery of the Mind, Bruno Snell 
observed that the shaping of Western thought by its beginnings 
in Greek thought has paradoxically impeded our ability to under-
stand Greek authors: "Because we are accustomed to regard the 
Greek way of thinking as obligatory, we instinctively-or should 
we say naively?-project it also into thought processes of another 
order. " 1 The achievements of the later Greeks, especially Plato 
and Aristotle, have erected mental barriers to our comprehension 
of their predecessors. 
Snell explored the Greeks' gradual discovery of the human 
intellect by carefully analyzing their expression and use of lan-
guage. Professor Havelock, in The Greek Concept of Justice, 
adopts a similar developmental approach in tracing from Homer 
to Plato the uses of dike ("justice") and •its derivatives. The evo-
lution of dike, for Havelock, is closely related to the transition of 
Greek society from its oral to its literate stage. We do not know 
exactly when that transition occurred {pp. 9-10). We know that 
the Iliad and the Odyssey were orally composed, but not whether 
that manner of composition was a matter of artistic choice or of 
necessity. Havelock suggests that the early Hellenic period (900-
650 B.C.) in which the poems were evidently composed was prob-
ably either nonliterate or semiliterate; that is, that Homer had 
no choice {p. 9). Since that period saw the genesis of classical 
Greek culture, including the consolidation of villages into poleis 
and the rise of Greek moral and social consciousness, Havelock 
asks how cultural progress could have been made without written 
documents (pp. 10-11, 55). 
In preliterate societies, Havelock postulates, the epic or its 
equivalent stores and transmits culture, conserving the nomos 
and ethos, the life-style and proprieties, of the audience which 
hears it. Meter, music, and narrative are mnemonic and pedagog-
ical aids. A literate society would preserve such information pri-
marily through didactic statements: ·Thou shalt not steal. In a 
preliterate society, instruction is by indirection, and society's 
nomos and ethos are revealed through actions performed by 
agents rather than through didactic statements: Agamemnon's 
seizure of Achilles' slave-girl provokes a feud among the Greeks 
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that destroys their military campaign against the Trojans until 
Agamemnon redresses the injury (p. 220). 
Because the Homeric epics preserved culture in this way, 
their presentation of "justice" is particular ~nd situational. 
"Justice" as an abstract normative principle does not appear (pp. 
13-14). In the Iliad, "justice" is a procedure for resolving disputes 
before a mass audience whose witnessing of the contending par-
ties' confessions, vows, · and settlements substitutes for written 
documents as a record of the event (pp. 133-37). "Justice" is the 
replacement of physical conflict with a form of public negotia-
tion. It is an intracity propriety, existing in the Iliad within the 
context of intercity warfare. Within the city, disputes are prop-
erly resolved peacefully through negotiation. There is no similar 
sense of propriety between cities, where disputes are violently 
resolved. In the Odyssey, "justice" appears primarily as the in-
tercity propriety of acting hospitably to guests. "The Odyssey," 
Havelock observes, "is par excellence the oral encyclopedia of the 
maritime complex, encoding and reporting and recommending 
those patterns of pan-Hellenic behavior which also could protect 
interpolis traffic and enable the complex to work" (p. 177). 
Havelock's important point is that in neither epic does Homer 
identify "justice" as an abstract "principle with a priori founda-
tions, either as a 'rule of law' or as a moral sense in man. . . . 
This kind of justice is simply the conservation of existing mores, 
or the correction of a violation. It does not prescribe what in 
general the mores 'ought' to be" (pp. 180-81). . 
Havelock theorizes that the progression of Greek society into 
literacy enabled later Greek writers to approach an abstract con-
cept of justice, a process that reached fruition with Plato (pp. 13-
14). Literacy obviated the need to store information orally and for 
the mnemonic devices that were necessary to do so. Nomos and 
ethos could be discussed without narrative, without "agents act-
ing or behaving in response to other agents" (p. 221). Literacy 
made possible the use of non personal subjects and objects, as well 
as verbs that "indicate not actions or situations which take place 
in time but relationships connected by a timeless logic" (p. 221). 
The verb "to be" played a particularly important role in the 
development of "justice" as an abstract concept; it became truly 
copulative (xis y) and thus capable of expressing abstract identi-
fication only as Greek became a written language (pp. 221, 233-
48). 
The temporal priority of Homer to Hesiod has been debated 
since the fifth century B.C., but Havelock argues persuasively 
866 Michigan Law Review lVol. 77:864 
that Hesiod composed in a more literate age than did Homer, and 
probably with a text of Homer in front of him (pp. 214-15). He-
siod's poems bear many of the hallmarks of oral composition, but 
one notices a gradual abandonment of narrative and an increas-
ing use of impersonals (p. 226). Hesiod was the first of the Greeks 
to isolate justice as a topic, yet he failed·to articulate an abstract 
concept of "justice" because the linguistic conditions of preliter-
acy were still strong. Hesiod could describe what "justice" did, 
but not what it was (p. 232). In this sense, he was protoliterate 
and protoconceptual (p. 232). 
After Hesiod, "justice" was not again isolated as a topic until 
Plato, perhaps some 250 years later, though "justice" appears 
incidentally in intervening authors. Havelock sees an increasingly 
abstract use of "justice" in this period, and particularly an ad-
vance toward the use of "to be" as a copula. However, the poetic 
traditions of orality, especially narrative, prevented the appear-
ance of "justice" as an abstraction (p. 14). Solon (circa 600 B.C.) 
was an Athenian statesman, lawgiver, and poet. What fragments 
we have of his code are addressed to the legal specifics off actual 
situations; only in his poems do we get any glimpse of the 
"justice" that presumably informed his legislation (p. 252). In the 
poems, he uses "justice" in its preliterate sense as a procedure for 
resolving disputes. There is no conception of "justice" as a nor-
mative principle (pp. 253, 262). In the pre-Socratic philosophers 
"justice does not exceed the logical limits of that propriety and 
regularity which was the fundamental form of Homeric society," 
though the word was cosmologically extended to explain natural 
phenomena (p. 271). In Aeschylus (525/4-456 B.C.), "Justice col-
lides with Justice" (p. 295): "justice" appears in contradictory 
uses in different dramatic situations and is symbolically ex-
ploited for artistic purposes rather than fixed with a philosophical 
definition. We do not find out what "justice" is (pp. 293-95). 
"Justice" is nonconceptual in Herodotus (fifth century B.C.) as 
well, though Havelock observes that the appearance in the 
History of a new word for "justice", dikaiosune, marked an im-
portant step in the process of abstraction since that appearance 
indicated "that there is a justice within man as well as one which 
he operates in society" (p. 306). 
Unlike those in the oral tradition, Plato discarded the mne-
monic devices of narrative and meter. Further, he used the verb 
"to be" as a copula to denote logical, static relationships between 
subjects and predicates (p. 325). His Republic was the first dis-
cussion of "justice" as a topic since Hesiod. As a fully literate 
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author, Plato could conceptualize "justice" as a normative prin-
ciple (p. 14). Plato's "justice" has two aspects, a public and a 
private one. As a social formula, Plato's "justice" does not greatly 
differ from that of the oral tradition: the "just" man responds to 
the traditional rules of propriety that protect the no mos and ethos 
of Greek society (p. 320). Plato rejects, however, the procedural 
aspects of "justice" that were particularly prominent in the Iliad: 
the "just" society will have no disputes to resolve, and so will not 
need remedial procedures (p. 321). Havelock observes, "Plato's 
justice, as writ large in the city, becomes the symbol of unchang-
ing stability" (p. 321). More important to Plato than this social 
formula was his theory of "justice" as a purely personal morality, 
as an ordering of the psyche to provide the individual "the same 
unshakeable, unchanging stability that the polis enjoys" (p. 322). 
This was a radical break from tradition, and one previously im-
possible because of the failure of previous authors to abstract 
"justice" from the particular situations in which they found it. 
Plato's rejection of poetry in the Republic, Havelock suggests, 
was based on that historical failure (pp. 330-32). 
Havelock combines the developmental approach to the study 
of Greek thought, adopted from Snell, with the approaches of the 
"oralist" school, represented by Marshall McLuhan and Walter 
Ong. Havelock acknowledges his sympathy with McLuhan's 
aphorism "The medium is the message," agreeing that "the 
character of a given technology of communication exercises con-
siderable control over its content" (p. 336). However, he dissents 
from some oralists' disparagement of "linear literacy," since,-as 
his book demonstrates, the shift from orality to literacy in ancient 
Greece clearly produced "liberating consequences for the mind" 
(p. 336). In the widest sense, Havelock's point is that, while 
today's technological orality offers added possibilities for commu-
nication, we should not lose sight of the advantages of written 
communication, specifically, its superior ability to convey philo-
sophical concepts. Postliteracy differs significantly from preliter-
acy in having the choice of communicating through writing. Mod-
ern oral media may supplement, but will not replace, written 
communication (p. 336). On this level, and as a history of the idea 
of justice in ancient Greece, Havelock's book is a success. 
